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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main goals of criminal procedure is to expose the factual truth.1  
Exposure of the truth is essential so that justice can be done in a criminal 
procedure,2  because it enables the court to determine whether the defendant 
is guilty or innocent. It is in society’s interest to convict guilty defendants and 
to acquit those who are innocent.3 The ability to convict guilty defendants and 
acquit the innocent depends on the court’s ability to expose the factual truth.4 
However, revealing the factual truth is not a supreme and absolute value. 
There are cases in which the desire to reach the truth succumbs to other im-
portant values worthy of protection; for example, exclusionary rules of evi-
dence or privileges may be granted for relevant information. These rules are 
intended to protect important values such as privacy, the right to due process 
or free communication between a lawyer and their client, even at the cost of a 
potential harm to the fact-finding task (since they prevent the court from ob-
taining evidence) and the court’s ability to do justice. 
In order to protect the values of domestic harmony and the integrity of the 
family unit, many jurisdictions have been prompted to determine special rules 
restricting the testimony of spouses and/or parents and children in criminal 
proceedings. In some legal systems, including in Israel, the witness’s compe-
tence to give evidence (for the prosecution) against a family member is an-
nulled, while other systems,  like the USA, Australia and Germany, grant these 
witnesses privilege that enables them to avoid testifying against their family 
member.5 The main purpose of these rules is to maintain the integrity of the 
family unit and to avoid compelling people, who are in the most natural close 
and trust-based relationship, to harm their family member.6 Additionally, 
when family members have an interest in the matter, putting them on the wit-
ness stand presents them with a difficult dilemma: having to choose between 
 
 1 WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 117 (1985); 
Aharon Barak, On Law, Judgment and Truth, MISHPATIM 27 11, 13 (1996); Yaniv Vaki, 
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: THE FLEXIBILITY OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 146–151 
(2013); Emanuel Gross, The Adversarial Debate Method in Criminal Procedure–Does It 
Enable Judicial Activism, STUDIES IN LAW 17 867, 874–75 (1993) (indicating that the im-
portant goal of criminal procedure is to administer justice for the sides in the trial, while 
one of the fundamental conditions for the realization of this goal is to permit the investiga-
tion of the truth). 
 2 Barak, supra note 1. 
 3 LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (Gerald Postema ed. 2006). 
 4 Mordechai Kremnitzer, Rethinking Criminal Process, 17 MISHPATIM 475, 478 (1987). 
 5 See discussion below, in Part Two. 
 6 Memorandum to Amend the Evidence Law (Relatives’ Testimony) cl. 3 (2013) [here-
inafter Memorandum to the Law of 2013]; see also CA 500/77 Omri v. State of Israel 
33(22) PD 681, 698–99 (1979) (Isr.); ELIAHU HARNON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 86–88 
(1970); CrimC 4/84 State of Israel v. Balut, PM (1) 324, 328–29 (1985) (Isr.). 
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a duty of loyalty to the family member versus the duty of loyalty to the truth.7 
The assumption is that when the prosecution is entitled to compel witnesses 
to give evidence against their family members, this harms domestic harmony 
and the stability of the family. Thus, these rules, which prevent the witnesses 
from giving incriminating testimony against their family members, protect 
these values, even at the cost of harm to the aims of criminal law. 
As a rule, there are two main models for the regulation of family members’ 
testimony in different legal systems. I shall call these models the competence 
model and the privilege model. Under the competence model, family mem-
bers do not have the competence to testify on behalf of the prosecution in 
certain cases. In these cases, the prosecution is not entitled to summon a per-
son on its behalf to testify against a family member. Such an arrangement in 
which a person is not competent to testify against a family member is an ex-
ception to the competence rule that developed in common law and that was 
adopted by modern law, under which every person has the competence to tes-
tify in any legal proceedings.8 
The rationale underpinning the competence rule is to enable the court to 
receive information that is relevant to the case independent of the identity of 
the person giving the information.9 This helps the court in its work of reveal-
ing the truth and doing justice. When the family member’s competence to tes-
tify for the prosecution is annulled, although the task of revealing the truth 
and doing justice is harmed, any possible harm to domestic harmony and the 
integrity of the family unit is avoided.10 
The second model that developed in different legal systems is the privilege 
model. Under this model, the witness is granted the privilege to choose not to 
testify for the prosecution against their family member. In contrast to the com-
petence model, a privilege does not annul a person’s competence to testify 
against their family member, rather it gives them, as the holder of the 
 
 7 CA 500/77 Omri v. State of Israel 33(22) PD 681, 699 (1979) (Isr.); HARNON, supra 
note 6, at 87. 
 8 HODGE M. MALEK, JONATHAN AUBURN, RODERICK BAGSHAW, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 
257 (19th ed. 2018); RICHARD GLOVER, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 164 (15th ed. 2017); 
JEFFERSON L. INGRAM, EVIDENCE 249–250 (12th ed. 2015); CROSS & TAPPER, ON EVIDENCE 
223–224 (12th ed. 2010); see also KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 414–17 (17th ed. 2013); Evidence Ordinance, 5729–1971 
§ 2, (Isr.) (determining the general rule that everyone has the competence to testify in any 
trial, subject to what is said in Sections 3 and 4, and no one is disqualified as a witness 
because he is a litigant in a civil court case, or the complainant or accused in a criminal 
case, or because he is the employer, employee, spouse, or relative of the claimant, the com-
plainant, the respondent or the accused, or because he was convicted or bears a punishment 
for a crime). 
 9 See  GABRIEL HALEVI, THEORY OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 413 (2013) [Hebrew]. 
 10 See, e.g., Marital Privilege, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mar 
ital_privilege (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). 
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privilege, the right to refuse to give testimony.11 In the case where the witness 
refuses to testify against a family member, it is impossible to compel them to 
do so by imposing a sanction on them due to the refusal.12 The holder of this 
privilege is also entitled to waive their privilege and testify against their rela-
tive. Thus, whether the law annuls family members’ competence or grants 
them privilege, it prevents the court from receiving relevant evidence that 
might advance the search for the truth. This may increase the risk for judicial 
mistakes that will be expressed in the acquittal of guilty defendants, when the 
single or principal evidence is the recollection of a family member whose ev-
idence is not heard in court. Since the goal of criminal procedure is to convict 
guilty defendants and to acquit the innocent, these regulations harm the ability 
of the prosecution and courts to convict guilty defendants. 
The aim of this Article is to present a discursive, normative, and critical 
discussion on the two main general models that have developed in different 
jurisdictions. Part One of the Article discusses the competence model in com-
parison with the privilege model. In this chapter, I discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these models. Part Two consists of a comparative 
discussion, in which I examine different methods of regulation employed 
around the world for family members’ testimony in criminal proceedings. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative, descriptive view of this 
issue, which will explain the normative tension existing between the protec-
tion of the search for the truth and protection of the integrity of the family 
unit, and the balance between them in each of the above-mentioned legal sys-
tems. 
In light of these discussions and the conclusions reached in the first two 
sections of the Article, in Part Three I attempt to answer the question: What 
is the optimal model to appropriately and justly create a balance between the 
two conflicting values—the search for the truth in opposition to the integrity 
of the family unit? 
II. PART ONE: THE REGULATION OF FAMILY MEMBERS’ TESTIMONY 
ACCORDING TO THE “COMPETENCE MODEL” AS OPPOSED TO THE 
“PRIVILEGE MODEL” 
The competence model annuls the witness’s competence to testify against 
their family member. This model assumes that evidence given against the 
family member could disturb the integrity and the stability of the family unit. 
For this reason, spouses, and in some jurisdictions parents and children, 
should be prevented from testifying against one another, except in 
 
 11 Except when the law allows the courts to compel the witness to testify, as in Australian 
law, which is discussed in the second chapter of this Article. 
 12 See Paul F. Rothstein & Susan W. Crump, Who May Claim the Adverse Spousal Tes-
timonial Privilege, FED. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 4:5 (2019). 
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extraordinary cases. The advantage of the competence model is that it does 
not permit the prosecution to use an individual’s testimony against their fam-
ily member. In this manner, the model protects the integrity of the family unit 
from any possible harm that might be caused as a result of that person testify-
ing against their spouse and/or child or parent. 
However, in order to protect the family’s unity, society must sacrifice other 
no less important values: truth and justice. The assumption is that if the com-
petence of that individual-relative was not annulled, their evidence would as-
sist the court in clarifying the truth while reducing the probability that the 
judge will make mistakes in fact-finding. The annulment of family members’ 
competence harms public interest since it makes it difficult for the prosecution 
to bring guilty defendants to trial and to convict them in cases where the sole 
or main incriminating evidence against the defendant is that of their family 
member. While, as a rule, testimony that can benefit a family member is per-
mitted—and may help their defense—evidence against the family member is 
forbidden, and its absence hinders the possibility of bringing guilty defendants 
to court and convicting them. Consequently, the prohibition prevents the court 
from receiving information against the accused and protects guilty defendants 
while frustrating attempts to prosecute and convict them.13 As a result, the 
goals of penal law cannot be achieved. 
From the deontological viewpoint of punishment, justice demands retalia-
tion against guilty defendants who have committed a crime and harmed pro-
tected values.14 Annulling the family member’s competence to testify also ob-
structs the utilitarian purposes of punishment.15 Additionally, failure to punish 
 
 13 Asaf Harduf, Husband vs. Wife, Truth vs. Family, Or: The Fourth Gaze at Compe-
tency to Testify in Criminal Law, HAIFA L. REV. 273, 302, 319, 324 (2007). 
 14 One of the most important and influential theories of morality is the deontological 
morality theory originating from the Kantian philosophy school. Deontological theory em-
phasizes the internal value of an act, irrespective of the issue of its result. Accordingly, 
there is justification for the imposition of criminal responsibility on the condition that guilt 
adheres to the actor’s behavior. The argument is that when a person chooses to harm social 
values, they deserve negative feedback from the society in the form of condemnation, con-
viction and punishment. All modern penal law systems demand the existence of guilt in 
order to constitute a crime. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans. 1873) (1785); IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hasti trans. 1887) (1796); IMMANUEL KANT, 
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans. 1965) (1797); GEORG WILHELM 
FREDERICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS (T.M. Knox trans. 1969); GABRIEL 
HALEVY, 1 THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 155–56 (2009); YORAM RABIN & YANIV VAKI, 3 
CRIMINAL LAW 1429–30 (3d. ed. 2014) [Hebrew]. 
 15 According to the consequentialist theory of morality, developed in the 19th century 
by Jeremy Bentham and his follower, John Stuart Mill, actions should be evaluated accord-
ing to the extent to which they produce happiness. This approach has its origins in the 
teachings of Aristotle and relies on the insight that the action itself has no moral value, and 
it should be evaluated according to its results. Since Bentham saw the search for maximal 
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guilty defendants prevents society’s attempts to rehabilitate them and reinte-
grate them within society as a law-abiding citizen. Thus, failure to punish the 
offender impairs the punishment’s deterring ability, because when there is no 
concrete threat of actual punishment, there is no deterrence for the offender’s 
recidivism, nor will other potential offenders be deterred from committing the 
same crimes. The fact that the accused will not be prosecuted and will not be 
punished for this also harms the main goal of sentencing, since it does not 
allow society to incapacitate offenders, or at least limit their ability, to con-
tinue to harm society and its members. Clearly, the privilege model provides 
a response to these disadvantages. This model, as noted, does not annul family 
members’ competence to testify one against the other, but rather it gives them 
the right to choose whether to testify against their relatives or not. When the 
witness chooses to testify against their family member, then it is possible to 
realize the proceedings against whoever has harmed society’s values and to 
convict them. 
The privilege model has an additional advantage over the competence 
model. In a world where information is limited and the transmission of infor-
mation to the court is subject to legal restrictions such as exclusionary rules 
of evidence,16 the grant of privilege17 impedes the authorities’ ability to obtain 
relevant information derived from the witness’s senses and to transmit it to 
 
happiness as a supreme moral goal, then punishment should also be motivated by the same 
forward-looking rationale. It is therefore only possible to justify punishment when it is 
imposed in order to attain goals that are useful for society such as deterring criminals from 
committing additional offenses or educating or rehabilitating the criminal. See JOHN 
STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, THE UTILITARIANS 17 (1961); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 162–68  (1789); DAVID 
LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 1–29 (1965); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 23–26 (1971); RABIN & VAKI, supra note 14, at 1422–23; HALEVY, supra note 14, 
at 173. 
 16 See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 8, at 292; BROUN, supra note 8, at §§ 87–97 (discussing 
the rule against hearsay that prevents the court from receiving evidence that was brought 
to the knowledge of the witness because of second-hand testimony and was not absorbed 
through the witness’s own senses). 
 17 Privilege grants the witness the right to avoid passing on the information in the court 
proceedings. In general, privileges operate to protect communications made within the con-
text of various professional relationship. The rationale advanced for these privileges is that 
public policy requires the encouragement of communication, without which these relation-
ships cannot be effective. See BROUN, supra note 8, at 465–66. The following are examples 
of such privileges: privilege between clients and their lawyers; privilege for confidential 
information secured in the course of the physician-patient relationship; privileges for gov-
ernment secrets; the clergyman-confessor privilege; the journalist’s privilege; executive 
and governmental privileges; privilege against self-incrimination which is defined in the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; privilege for improperly obtained evidence; 
privilege for marital communications, etc. See, e.g., CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 8, at 415 
–75; MALEK ET AL., supra note 8, at 661–811; GLOVER, supra note 8, at 642–723; BROUN, 
supra note 8, at 465–992; see also SCOTT N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGES (1983). 
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the court, while the passing of time also makes it difficult to clarify the truth. 
Thus, against the background of all these factors, the annulment of a person’s 
competence to testify against their family member is yet another obstruction 
to the flow of information to the court and hinders its ability to reveal the 
factual truth. Even if it is claimed that protection of the family unit justifies 
the harm that is caused to the purposes of the substantive and procedural crim-
inal law, it is difficult to justify those damages, when the witness is interested 
in testifying against their family member.  In this situation, the witness has 
revealed that they are interested in prosecuting the defendant and doing justice 
with them, while also ensuring justice for themselves, despite the harm to the 
family unit. Moreover, giving incriminating evidence indicates that the family 
unit has already been disrupted. When witnesses express their consent to tes-
tify against family members, they are naturally aware of the implications of 
their testimony including the possible harm to their relationship with their 
family members. However, when witnesses are willing to sacrifice all of this 
so that justice can be done with their guilty family member, then they should 
be allowed to testify. 
In contrast, another argument—of principle—can be presented, supporting 
the competence model. It can be argued that the competence model assumes 
that the family unit is a social value worthy of protection, and that it is not the 
private value or interest of any witness. In other words, society has an interest 
in fostering and protecting the institution of the family, and it should not be 
“privatized” nor should whoever wishes to harm it be allowed to do so. For 
example, lawyer-client privilege applies even after the work relationship be-
tween them ends, to enable people to trust their lawyers with full confidence. 
This is a connection or relationship that society wishes to foster and protect, 
because the assumption is that people cannot completely trust their lawyers if 
the lawyer could one day testify against them.18 Thus, it can be argued that 
allowing the relative to choose whether to testify against their family member 
or not, even after the event disturbed the family unit, could in general harm 
the institution of the family, which is an institution that society wishes to en-
courage. In this sense, the competence model provides a good safety-net for 
the general-social institution of the family in contrast to the privilege model, 
which sees the protection of the family unit as a personal matter. 
 
 18 See, e.g., Evidence Order (New Version), 5731–1971, §48, 2 LSI 209 (1972) (Isr.) 
(arranging lawyer-client privilege and determining that: (a) for objects and documents ex-
changed between a lawyer and their client or between another person on behalf of the cli-
ent, which has a relevant connection to the professional service provided by the lawyer to 
the client, there is no obligation that the lawyer should deliver them as evidence, unless the 
client waives their privilege; and this is also the rule for an employee of the lawyer when 
objects and documents given to the lawyer reached their hands as a result of their work in 
the service of the lawyer; (b) the stipulations of sub-clause (a) will also apply after the 
witness ceases to be served by the lawyer or by the lawyer’s employee). 
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An additional advantage is the legal certainty offered by the competence 
model, improving the prosecutor’s ability to handle criminal files. Once the 
witnesses are granted privilege, the choice whether to testify or not is left in 
their hands until the moment they testify. In such a situation, a state of uncer-
tainty prevails that makes it difficult to manage the procedure because the 
decision whether to present a bill of indictment, or not, relies on the existence 
of a reasonable probability of conviction. This decision depends on the exist-
ence of evidence that incriminate the accused. Therefore, when this set of ev-
idence includes a condemning assertion that is subject to the witness’ discre-
tion at trial, such circumstances make it more difficult for the prosecutor to 
estimate the probability of conviction both for the presentation of the bill of 
indictment and the consolidation of a plea bargain. Moreover, it is difficult to 
impose detention when the main consideration for this is the uncertain ability 
of the main witness to testify. 
Another justification for the competence model is that when the delivery 
of the testimony is given to the discretion of the witnesses, the witness is ex-
posed to pressure by those who wish to persuade them not to testify. In my 
opinion, this argument by itself cannot support the annulment of the family 
member’s competence. The fact that the witness may endure improper pres-
sures and influences creates a difficulty that the court should cope with. Inso-
far as the testimonies of family members are subject to the witness’ consent, 
rules can be determined to minimize those improper pressures and influences. 
For example, in the Australian legal system, discussed in Part Two below, it 
is possible to grant the court the authority, in certain cases, to rule that privi-
lege is removed and that the witness must appear in court, despite their refusal 
to testify.19 Another way is to grant the court the authority to compel the wit-
ness to give evidence when the prosecutor proves that the refusal of the wit-
ness to appear in court to testify stems from external pressure. Yet another 
way is to ask the witness to agree to testify at the end of their interrogation in 
the police station, without leaving them the possibility of retracting this con-
sent to testify later on. Alternatively, when the witness agrees to testify but 
afterwards alters their intention, and it is proven that their refusal to testify 
stems from  external pressure, it may be possible to find a solution by asking 
 
 19 See infra pp. 400–02 for a consideration of Australian law. In English law, legal pro-
fessional privilege is absolute and potentially permanent. It does not end even with the 
death of the client and continues indefinitely unless waived. See GLOVER, supra note 8, at 
695. A similar situation exists in American law, where “the accepted theory is that the 
protection afforded by the privilege will in general survive the death of the client.” BROUN, 
supra note 8, § 94, at 581; see also State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976); 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401 (1998). In Swidler, the court empha-
sized that the knowledge that communications will remain confidential even after death 
“encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with counsel.” Id. at 407. But see 
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2314, 2329 (John T. 
McNaughton ed. 1961) (pointing out a narrow exception to attorney-client privilege sur-
viving death in the case of wills). 
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the court to summon the witness to appear in court and to testify. It follows, 
that it will be possible to provide a response to the fear that the witness will 
be subject to pressure that will deter them from testifying, and there is nothing 
in this fear of itself to constitute a consideration against the adoption of the 
privilege model. 
From the above review it seems that each of the models has its own ad-
vantages. If the advantages of the competence model are expressed in the pro-
tection of the integrity of the family unit, legal certainty and stability that it 
provides, then the main advantages of the privilege model are expressed in 
advancing the fact-finding task and doing justice and also in better realization 
of the goals of penal law and the purposes of criminal procedure. 
In the next section, I examine various overseas rules relating to family 
members’ testimony. Each of these arrangements subdues the state of norma-
tive tension between the fact-finding task  and the integrity of the family unit 
in a different manner, and determines the point of balance between them in a 
different position along the normative spectrum. 
III. PART TWO: FAMILY MEMBERS’ TESTIMONY IN COMPARATIVE LAW–A 
DISCURSIVE AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In this section, I discuss the legal status of family members’ testimony in 
comparative law. Within its pages, I note extant arrangements in English, 
American, Australian and Israeli law. Each of these legal systems regulates 
family members’ testimony in a different manner. This comparative discus-
sion is restricted to these states, since it aims to compare the different ways in 
which different jurisdictions subdue the normative tension between striving 
for the truth on the one hand and the integrity of the family unit on the other 




In England, the law distinguishes between competence to testify and com-
pellability to testify.20 English law stipulates that any person has the compe-
tence to testify and can be compelled to testify.21 This rule is subject to excep-
tions, a remnant of English common law and other exceptions anchored in 
legislation. The exception that relates to family members’ testimony in a crim-
inal procedure is anchored in the terms of Section 80(2)–80(4) of The Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PCEA).22 In English law, the definition 
of “spouse” for the matter of the duty to testify, includes a person who is 
 
 20 RICHARD GLOVER & PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 552 (13th ed. 2013). 
 21 Id. 
 22 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 80 (UK), http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/80. 
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legally married to the accused according to English law on the date when the 
evidence is heard23 or a partner of the same sex recognized by law as a “civil 
partner” on the date when the evidence is heard.24 According to the stipulation 
of Section 80(2A) of the PCEA, it is possible to compel a person to testify in 
the trial of their accused spouse, but only in two cases: the first, when the 
accused summons their spouse to testify to their benefit in respect of any spec-
ified offense25 and the second, when the prosecutor summons the spouse to 
testify against their spouse in offences of domestic violence, or sex offences 
and violence against minors under the age of 16.26 English law, in contrast to 
Israeli law, does not relate to parents’ and children’s competence to testify. 
Consequently, parents have the competence to testify in the trial of their chil-
dren and vice versa. Additionally, in criminal trials in England, the prosecut-
ing authorities have broad administrative discretion to summon parents to tes-
tify against their children and also children against their parents.27 
 
B. United States of America 
 
In U.S. federal law, a spouse’s testimony is regulated under the privilege 
model. Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states “every person is com-
petent to be a witness unless these rules . . . provide otherwise,” setting forth 
a competency rule.28 Rule 501 provides that “the privilege of a witness [or] 
person . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.”29 In federal law, restrictions on relatives’ testimony is governed 
by case law, while in the various states, they are governed both by statute and 
 
 23 GLOVER & MURPHY, supra note 20, at 566. According to this definition, a “spouse” 
whose marriage is in principle void, spouses who married under foreign law, in a place 
where the marriage is not recognized as valid by English law, and also “cohabiting 
spouses” are not considered to be “spouses” for the purpose of this definition. 
 24 The Civil Partnership Act 2004, c. 33 P. 1 § 1 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uk 
pga/2004/33/section/1 (defining “civil partners,” which applies to Clause 80 of the PCEA). 
 25 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 80 (UK), http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/80. 
 26 Id. at § 80(3), (7). 
 27 See HALEVI, supra note 9, at 624. 
 28 FED. R. EVID. 601. The Federal Rules of Evidence are binding on federal courts, and 
many states have adopted the rules in their present composition or with alterations. See 
THE KNESSET—RESEARCH & INFO. CTR., FAMILY MEMBERS’ EVIDENCE-COMPARATIVE 
REVIEW 2a (2007), available in Hebrew at https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/194e 
6b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977/2_194e6b58-e9f7-e411-80c800155d010977_11_70 
21.pdf [hereinafter The Knesset Report]. 
 29 29 C.F.R. § 18.501 (2009). 
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case law. 30 The Supreme Court has recognized two types of privileges. The 
first type is privilege in the face of evidence against an accused spouse in a 
criminal trial (known as spousal/marital [adverse] testimonial privilege). This 
privilege grants the person the right to refuse to testify against their spouse, 
usually when the spouse is accused of committing an offense.31 In order to 
claim this type of privilege, the spouses must be married at the time of the 
trial.32 The holder of the privilege is the spouse who is to testify, and so, only 
they are eligible to waive the privilege,33 and to testify against the spouse-
defendant, without the latter being able to prevent them from doing so. It is 
noted that in addition to its appearance in federal law, this privilege exists in 
thirty-one U.S. states.34 Most of these states only implement the privilege in 
criminal law, while some of them apply it in civil proceedings as well.35 In 
the decisive majority of the states, the holder of this type of privilege is the 
testifying spouse.36 In the states of Arizona, Minnesota, Washington, and Col-
orado, the privilege holder is the accused.37 In the states of Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, Virginia, and Wyoming, both spouses hold the privilege.38 
This means that in order for the spouse to be able to testify against their ac-
cused spouse, the consent of both spouses is required.39 In these states, if a 
spouse is interested in testifying against their accused spouse, the accused has 
the power to prevent this evidence against them from being heard. However, 
even when the accused does not oppose the hearing of this testimony, their 
spouse is entitled to refuse to testify against them.40 Most of the states that 
recognize privilege of this type also determine exceptions, in which privilege 
will not apply and the spouse must testify against their accused spouse, such 
 
 30 The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at cl. 2.b.1. In different states, the privileges are 
derived from both case law and legislation. See also R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering 
Special Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 339 (2006). 
 31 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). In this case the Supreme Court af-
firmed the existence of an adverse testimonial privilege under federal law. 
 32 United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1983). A valid marital relation-
ship includes  same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1204(e)(15) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §457:45 (2014). 
 33 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 53; Cassidy, supra note 30, at 357; see also 
United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that marital privilege 
belongs to testifying spouse only). 
 34 Cassidy, supra note 30, at 364 n.192 (indicating that these states include Alaska, Ar-
izona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, Oregon and Wyoming). 
 35 Id. at 365. 
 36 Id.; The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2b.1. 
 37 Cassidy, supra note 30, at 365 n.196. These states apply the approach that preceded 
the decision in Trammel, in which the privilege holder is the accused. 
 38 Id. at 365 n.197. 
 39 The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.b.1. 
 40 Cassidy, supra note 30, at 365. 
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as in sex and violent offenses perpetrated within the family.41 In those states, 
the defendant is not entitled to prevent their spouse from testifying against 
them.42 In a few states such as Massachusetts, Missouri, and the District of 
Columbia, no exceptions to privilege exist,43 making it difficult for the pros-
ecution to prove the perpetration of the offense in the absence of a third side 
who was witness to the event under trial. 
The second type of privilege, less relevant to the issue under discussion 
here, is Marital Communications Privilege. This privilege grants the individ-
ual the right to refuse to testify in court (in either criminal or civil proceedings) 
regarding confidential statements between the individual and their spouse in 
their marital relationship, in conversation or in writing. This is in order to 
protect the privacy of marital communications.44 This privilege is recognized 
both in federal law and in state law,45 and it applies in both criminal and civil 
proceedings. The conditions for the application of the privilege are the exist-
ence of an exchange of communication between the couple who were married 
at the time of the said communication, and that the communication was in-
tended to remain confidential.46 Each spouse holds the privilege and each of 
them is entitled to prevent the exposure of the information that they shared.47 
There is no need for one of the spouses to be a side in the legal proceedings 
in order to be able to use the privilege. 
Regarding the testimony of parents against their children or vice-versa, 
American federal law and most state laws do not recognize privilege between 
parents and children.48 Given this, as a rule, it is possible to oblige a parent to 
testify against their child and vice-versa.49 In 2005, a bill intended to amend 
 
 41 Id. at 367; The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.b.1. 
 42 Cassidy, supra note 30; The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.b.1. 
 43 Cassidy, supra note 30, at 367–68 n.207. 
 44 United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding the marital 
communications privilege “exists to ensure that spouses . . . feel free to communicate their 
deepest feelings to each other without fear of eventual exposure in a court of law.”); see 
Cassidy, supra note 30, at 356–58; The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.b.2. 
 45 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1980); Wolfle v. United States, 
291 U.S. 7 (1934); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Cassidy, supra note 30, at 
365–66. 
 46 Cassidy, supra note 30, at 357–58; The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.b.2.; see 
United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Rivera, 527 
F.3d 891, 906 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008); People v. Daghita, 86 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1949); United 
States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 
1, 6 (1954); United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1332 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 47 See United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that either 
spouse may invoke marital confidence privilege); Cassidy, supra note 30, at 358. 
 48 Tovia Smith, Should Parents Have to Testify Against Kids in Court?, NPR (July 30, 
2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128797358. 
 49 Minnesota and Idaho are the exceptions, extending the privilege to communications 
between parents and children. See The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.c. Gabriel Halevi 
notes that the legal technique for the adoption of limitations on the testimony of parents 
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the Federal Rules of Evidence and to add “parent and child” privilege that is 





Another example of a state in which family members’ testimony is regu-
lated under the privilege model is Australia. The Evidence Act 1995 deter-
mines that, apart from certain exceptions, every individual has the competence 
to testify and is even obliged to do so.51 Specifically, section 18 of the Evi-
dence Act regulates family members’ testimony.52 According to this section, 
 
and their children is within the discretion granted to states as part of their creation of rules 
of evidence. The federal courts may adopt the arrangements in the laws of evidence that 
were accepted in different states within Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
stipulates: 
[t]he common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of 
reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the 
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal 
statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, 
state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state 
law supplies the rule of decision. 
FED. R. EVID. 501. 
As a result of the authority granted by this rule, since the 1980s, the state courts have cre-
ated privilege rules for parents’ and children’s testimony, but they have not determined 
rules defining competence for this matter. See HALEVI, supra note 9, at 625. See generally 
Catherine Chiantella Stern, Don’t Tell Mom the Babysitter’s Dead: Arguments for a Fed-
eral Parent–Child Privilege and a Proposal to Amend Article V, 99 GEO. L. J. 605 (2011); 
Hillary B. Ferber, Do You Swear to Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the 
Truth Against Your Child?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551 (2010). 
 50 The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 2.c. According to this same proposal, step par-
ents and step children are considered “parents” and “children” for purposes of the law. See 
Parent-Child Privilege Act of 2005, H.B. 3433, 109th Cong. (2005). With regard to privi-
lege between “parent” and “child,” the proposed bill said that, in any criminal or civil pro-
ceeding where the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, neither a parent nor a child shall be 
compelled to testify against each other, unless the parent or the child serve as a witness, 
and knowingly and out of their free choice, waive the right to avoid testifying. Id. at § 2(b). 
With regard to privilege concerning communications that were intended to remain confi-
dential between parents and children, the bill states that in any civil or criminal proceedings 
to which the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, a parent or child will not be compelled to 
divulge private, confidential communications between them as part of the parent-child re-
lationship, unless both sides (parent and child) knowledgeably and out of free choice, waive 
the use of this privilege. Id. at § 2(c). The bill also sets out a list of exceptions in which the 
said privileges will not apply. Id. at § 2(d). 
 51 Evidence Act 1995 ch 2 pt 2.1 div 1 s 12. This clause stipulates: “Clause 12 - Com-
petence and compellability. Except as otherwise provided by this Act: (a) every person is 
competent to give evidence; and (b) a person who is competent to give evidence about a 
fact is compellable to give that evidence.” 
 52 Id. at s 18. 
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in criminal law, a spouse, partner, parent, or child of the defendant, is entitled 
to refuse to testify against them (as a witness for the prosecution) or to testify 
about communications between them.53 A witness who refuses to testify must 
express their opposition before giving evidence or close to the date on which 
they learned about their right to refuse to testify.54 In a case in which the court 
believes that the witness is entitled to refuse to testify, it should ensure that 
the witness knows and understands this right.55 However, their right to refuse 
to testify against their family member is not absolute. The court may order 
them to testify, unless the judge finds that direct or indirect harm will be 
caused to the witness or to their relations with the accused family member, 
and that the damage that may occur would outweigh any benefit of the testi-
mony that would be delivered.56 
Although the court has discretion in this matter, the law determines that 
the court must, as part of its decision, consider the following considerations: 
the nature and severity of the offense of which the defendant is accused; the 
content and importance of the evidence that the witness is expected to deliver 
and the weight that the court is likely to attribute to this evidence; and the 
possibility that the prosecutor can back this evidence with other evidence or 
testimony from a different source for the same matters that are in the evidence 
of the said witness.57 It should also consider the nature of the relationship 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 According to the rule in Clause 18(3) of the Act: “The objection is to be made before 
the person gives the evidence or as soon as practicable after the person becomes aware of 
the right so object, whichever is the later.” Id. at para 3; see also The Knesset Report, supra 
note 28, at 4.b. 
 55 According to Clause 18(4) of the Act: “If it appears to the court that a person may 
have a right to make an objection under this section, the court is to satisfy itself that the 
person is aware of the effect of this section as it may apply to the person.” Id. at para 4; see 
also The Knesset Report, supra note 28, at 4.b. 
 56 According to Clause 18(6) of the Act: 
A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence 
or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the 
evidence if the court finds that: (a) there is a likelihood that harm would 
or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to 
the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives 
the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the 
desirability of having the evidence given. 
Id. at para 6. 
 57 According to Clause18(7) of the Act, as translated in The Knesset Report, supra note 
28, at 3.b.1: 
Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court 
for the purposes of subsection (6), it must take into account the follow-
ing: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that 
the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) 
whether any other evidence concerning the matters to which the evidence 
of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) 
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between the witness and the defendant and whether in giving the testimony 
the witness will be obliged to expose a matter that was made known to them 
by the defendant in confidence and as part of the trust relations between them. 
The court’s decision on this matter is final and cannot be appealed.58 Apart 
from the court’s power to compel the witness to testify, the privilege does not 
apply when the defendant is accused of the following offenses: violent of-
fenses in the family;59 sex offences against a minor who is under the age of 
16,60 employment of a minor in work that endangers their health,61 neglect of 





Germany regulates family members’ testimony under the privilege model. 
The German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozeßordnung, StPO) deter-
mines that a person, generally, has the competence to testify and even is 
obliged to testify in the trial of a family member.64 Nevertheless, in a criminal 
trial, a person is not obliged to testify and the judge is not entitled to compel 
 
the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) 
whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter 
that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant. 
 58 According to Clause 18(8) of the Act: “If an objection under this section has been 
determined, the prosecutor may not comment on: (a) the objection; or (b) the decision of 
the court in relation to the objection; or (c) the failure of the person to give evidence.” Id. 
at para 8. 
 59 An offence that is a domestic violence offence within the meaning of the Domestic 
Violence Act 1986 of the Australian Capital Territory Domestic Violence Act 1986 (ACT) 
(Austl.). 
 60 Crimes Act 1900 (6th) pt 3 (Austl.) 
 61 Children’s Services Act 1986 (ACT) ss 133–35 (Austl.). 
 62 Id. s 139. 
 63 Id. s 140. 
 64 STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 48, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.). 
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them to testify in the trial of their “family member” despite their competence 




In Israel, the testimony of family members is regulated according to the 
competence model. The rules of evidence in Israel regulate the testimony of 
family members in a very comprehensive manner. They set out the general 
rules for this matter, exceptions to the rules, and restrictions to the exceptions. 
The second clause of the Israeli Evidence Ordinance (1971) creates a fun-
damental rule requiring any person who has the competence to testify in 
court.68 However, the competence rule is not absolute and there are several 
exceptions listed in the Evidence Ordinance.69 These exceptions are set out in 
the rules of Clauses 3 and 4 of the Order, and they relate to the testimony of 
“spouses” and “parent” and “child” in criminal proceedings. The rule set out 
by Clause 3 of the Order determines that in a criminal trial, a spouse does not 
 
 65 Id. at § 52. 
 66 Section 20 of chapter 17 of the Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure regulates family 
members’ testimony under the privilege model. Section 20 of the Code provides that cer-
tain family members are entitled but not obliged to testify. See CODE OF JUDICIAL 
PROCEDURE (Fin.) ch. 17, § 20 (2015), translation at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannoks 
et/1734/en17340004.pdf. Giving evidence is subject exclusively to the discretion of the 
witness, and the court is not entitled to compel the witness to testify. This arrangement 
applies to the following family members: whoever is married, engaged or was married to 
one of the sides in the proceedings; fathers or direct descendants of one of the sides to the 
proceedings, and also whoever is married or was married to the fathers or direct descend-
ants of one of the sides to the proceedings; brothers and sisters, or the spouse of brothers 
or sisters of a side to the proceedings and also adoptive parents or adoptive children of one 
of the sides. Id. 
 67 In Sweden the consideration of family members’ testimony is also regulated under the 
privilege model. The rule in Section 3 of chapter 36 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Pro-
cedure determines that the following family members are not obliged to testify against their 
family member: current or past spouses of a side to the proceedings; direct ancestors, de-
scendants, or their spouses of a side to the proceedings; brothers and sisters, or whoever is 
married to or was married to a brother or sister of one of the sides to the proceedings. 
RATTEGANGSBALKEN [RB] [CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE] 36:3 (Swed.). Insofar as the 
witness is not interested in testifying, it is not possible to compel the witness to testify, 
irrespective of which crime the family member is accused of committing. Id. 
 68 Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 2 (1971) (as amended) (Isr.). 
 69 Apart from the exceptions to the competence rule determined in Clauses 3 and 4 of 
the Evidence Order, there is an additional exception relating to the judge’s testimony on a 
matter that was subject to their judicial authority. This exception stems from case law de-
termining that a judge should not testify as a witness on the witness stand on a matter 
connected to their judicial role, and they should not even be summoned to testify on this. 
This rule prevents a judge from testifying on what occurred in a trial in which they presided. 
See CA 364/73 Zeidman v. State of Israel 28(2) PD 620, 627 (1974) (Isr.) [Hebrew]; State 
of Israel v. Yosef 58(3) PD 541, 552–553 (2004) (Isr.) [Hebrew]. 
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have the competence to testify against their spouse, and it is not possible to 
compel them to testify against the person accused with their spouse under the 
same writ of indictment.70 The rule in Clause 4 of the Order provides specific 
exceptions that in a criminal trial, a parent and child do not have the compe-
tence to testify against each other and that it is not possible to compel one of 
them to testify against a person who is accused with the other in the same writ 
of indictment.71 While testimony against a relative is regulated according to 
the competence model, testimony against the relative’s accomplice, who ap-
pears in the same writ of indictment, is regulated according to the privilege 
model. When the testimony is regulated under the privilege model, the witness 
has the competence to testify but cannot be compelled to do so.72 It is noted 
that these limitations do not apply when relatives are summoned to testify for 
the defense73 or when they are called to testify in a civil case. 
In addition to the exceptions that forbid family members from testifying 
against one another, Clause 5 of the Evidence Ordinance  sets out restrictions 
on the application of the Clause 4 exceptions.74 When the evidence falls within 
the boundaries of a restricted exception, the witness has the competence to 
testify and can even be compelled to do so.75 In fact, the restricted exception 
brings us back to the starting point—the rule that everyone has the competence 
to testify. 
Amendment 16 to the Evidence Ordinance (1971), enacted in December 
2015, re-arranged family members’ testimony in criminal proceedings. In the 
discussion below, I shall relate in brief to the legal status that existed before 
Amendment 16 to the Evidence Ordinance and the legal status that exists after 
the amendment went into force. 
 
i. The Legal Status of Family Members’ Testimony Before 
Amendment 16 to the Evidence Ordinance 
 
Clause 3 of the Evidence Ordinance  determines that in a criminal trial, a 
spouse does not have the competence to testify against their spouse and cannot 
be compelled to do so.76 Before Amendment 16, the Evidence Ordinance  
avoided defining who is considered a spouse. The courts filled in this gap in 
 
 70 Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 3. 
 71 Id. at cl. 4. 
 72 The inability to compel such testimony is shown by the absence of punitive or coer-
cive sanctions in the Evidence Order. See id. 
 73 See Evidence Order, cl. 6 (“[W]hen a spouse is called to testify on behalf of their 
spouse, or a parent or child is called to testify to the benefit of the other, then the testimony, 
either in initial examination or in cross-examination by the prosecution can serve as evi-
dence to prove the guilt of the accused.”) 
 74 See id. at cl. 5. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 3. 
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legislation with case law and interpreted the term “spouse” to include only 
married spouses, whether they lived together or apart, without recognizing an 
unmarried spouse for this purpose.77 This situation engendered a double dif-
ficulty. On the one hand, since the purpose of the exception that prohibits the 
spouse’s testimony is to prevent forcing a person to harm another person who 
is close to them, this purpose also exists when a “cohabiting spouse” is in-
volved, although the individuals are not married. On the other hand, the said 
purpose is not achieved when the spouse (either married or not) is separated 
or when they are in the process of divorce proceedings. This is the case, for 
example, when the husband refuses to give his wife a divorce (a possibility in 
Jewish law)78 and the couple lives apart. In such a case, there is no family unit 
or family harmony worthy of protecting with the laws of evidence. However, 
according to the law before the Amendment, there was no possibility of bring-
ing the husband to testify against his wife and vice-versa, so long as they re-
mained married. 
Moreover, the Evidence Ordinance before Amendment 16 annulled the 
competence of family members to testify against each other, even in situations 
where the defendant harmed a member of his family or when the family mem-
ber filed a complaint at the police station against their relative. This not only 
harms the fact-finding task but also causes injustice and absurd situations 
since it prevents victims from being able to realize proceedings against those 
who have harmed them.79 Hypothetically, in a case where a son perpetrated a 
financial offense against his elderly parents, the parents had no competence to 
testify against the son who harmed them, even in a case where they com-
plained about his acts at the police station and want to testify against him. In 
another matter that reached the Jerusalem court, a woman complained that her 
husband kidnapped her children from her custody, but she could not testify 
against him due to her lack of competence.80 Logic, common sense and a sense 
of justice made it clear that when a person chooses to bring a complaint against 
a member of his or her family, that person actually indicates that the family 
unit has already been disrupted and so there is no justification in preventing 
the witness from testifying under the argument of protecting the integrity of 
the family unit.81 However, the rules of evidence determined otherwise. This 
legal status continued until December 28, 2015, when Amendment 16 of the 
Evidence Ordinance came into force. 
 
 77 See Memorandum to the Law of 2013, supra note 6, at cl. c; see also CrimC 4/84 State 
of Israel v. Balut, PM (1) 324, 328–29 (1985) (Isr.). 
 78 In Israel, Jewish Divorce is Granted Only by Husband’s Permission, NPR (Mar. 1, 
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/01/389873594/in-israel-jewish-div 
orce-is-only-granted-by-husbands-permission. 
 79 This is on condition that Clause 5 of the Order is not applicable, which restricts the 
application of the exceptions. See Evidence Order, cl. 5. 
 80 See CrimC 4/84 State of Israel v. Balut, PM(1) 324, 328–29 (1985) (Isr.). 
 81 See Memorandum to the Law of 2013, supra note 6, at cl. c. 
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ii. Family Members’ Testimony After Amendment 16 to the Evi-
dence Ordinance 
 
a. Spouses’ Testimony 
 
The rules of Clause 3 of the Evidence Ordinance  determine that in a crim-
inal trial the prosecution is not entitled to enlist the testimony of one spouse 
against the other spouse.82 Before discussing the content of the exception, I 
would like to proffer several important clarifications.83 First, since this in-
volves a rule of competence, it cannot be conditioned or bypassed by the con-
sent of the parties. Secondly, the exception only applies to criminal proceed-
ings in court and does not apply to the taking of statements at the police 
station. When a spouse is required to go to the police station for the taking of 
evidence, they are obliged to do so even if the taking of evidence would in-
criminate their spouse regarding the perpetration of an offense.84 This state-
ment cannot serve as evidence in a court case against an accused spouse. Alt-
hough it is possible to use it to deepen the investigation, attaining evidence 
and summoning other witnesses, it cannot be presented as evidence in court 
since the witness who gave it does not have the competence to testify on the 
same matter. Thirdly, in order to annul the testifying competence of a spouse 
against their accused-spouse, the witness and the accused should comply with 
the definition of “spouse” on the day when the testimony is delivered and not 
on the day when the offense was committed. 
One of the main innovations accepted as a result of the amendment is ex-
pressed in the fact that for the first time the term spouse was defined, with 
regard to competence to testify, in the terms of Clause 8 of the Order, as fol-
lows: “‘spouse’ – includes a cohabiting partner as a spouse, except for a per-
son living separately from his spouse, who does not manage a common 
 
 82 The discussion will consider the first part of the rule in Clause 3. The end of the rule 
in this clause determines that a spouse cannot be compelled to testify against a person ac-
cused together with their spouse in the same writ of indictment. Evidence Order, 5731–
1971, cl. 3. According to this rule, the prosecution cannot force the witnessing spouse to 
testify against someone who is accused together with their accused spouse in the same writ 
of indictment. Id. Giving testimony in this situation is subject to the discretion of the spouse 
who was asked to testify. Id. This rule does not engender difficulty and it also was not 
altered by the amendment. 
 83 These clarifications are correct also for the exception regarding “parent” and “child” 
testimony as determined in Clause 4 of the Order, with the necessary adjustments. 
 84 This is with the exception of the case in which the spouse of the accused, their parent 
or child, has filed a complaint against them at the police station. According to Clause 5(b) 
and (c) of the Evidence Order, that was legislated as part of Amendment 16 to the Order, 
the witness will have the competence to testify in the trial of the accused in the same matter 
and can even be obliged to testify. See discussion infra Part Two, Sec. E.ii.c.1.2. 
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household together with him out of the intention to permanently disband their 
family life, even if they live under one roof.”85 
Although this definition enlarges the term “spouse” to include a cohabiting 
partner, it also reduces it in contrast to the situation before the amendment so 
that it does not apply to separated couples or those who intend to disband the 
family unit. The word “including” signifies that the definition of a spouse, 
which had become enrooted in case law before the amendment, continues to 
stand as valid alongside the exclusion of separated couples and the inclusion 
of cohabiting partners. Consequently, in order to know who is included in the 
definition of a spouse, it is not sufficient to refer to the rules of Clause 8; rather 
it is necessary to also refer to the case law that circumscribed and delineated 
the term spouse before the amendment, which continues to be valid even to-
day. The case law determined that spouses, in the context of the Evidence 
Ordinance, are partners who are married one to the other on the day of delivery 
of the testimony in marriages that are valid under Israeli law.86 In Israel, con-
jugal matters are under the exclusive authority of the religious courts, which 
only apply religious law.87 For Jews, Section 2 of the Rabbinical Courts Ju-
risdiction Law (Marriage and Divorce) (1953) says that marriage and divorce 
of Jews [irrespective of their nationality] will be carried out in Israel according 
to the law of the torah.88 For members of other recognized religious sectors in 
Israel, if they are Israeli nationals, then their conjugal affairs are under the 
unique authority of their religious courts.89 For this reason, Israeli law recog-
nizes marriages that were performed according to religious law. Thus, the def-
inition of spouse in Clause 8 of the Evidence Ordinance relates primarily to 
 
 85 Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 8. 
 86 See CA 78/62 Darshani v. State of Israel, D 16(3) 1814 (1962); CA 500/77 Omri v. 
State of Israel 33(2) PD 681, 698–99 (1979); CrimC 4/84 State of Israel v. Balut, 5745 324, 
328–29 (1985) (“[t]he legislator’s duty is that in a criminal trial a spouse does not have the 
competence to testify against their spouse and it makes no difference if this involves 
spouses who live together or spouses who live apart. So long as the spouses are husband 
and wife at the time of giving testimony, they are incapacitated as witnesses to testify 
against one another. Incapacitation of the spouse to testify continues according to the rule 
in the clause as long as the conjugal connection exists between the spouses, and only dis-
appears if they untie it.”); see also HCJ 3045/05 Ben Ari v. Director of Population Admin-
istration in the Ministry of Interior 61(3) PD 537 (2006) (holding that registration with the 
Population Administration is not determinative on whether the registering individuals are 
legally married). 
 87 BENZION SCHERESCHEWSKY & MICHAEL CORINALDI, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 195 
(2015). 
 88 Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713–1953, § 2, 139 
(1951–1953) (Isr.). When a man and woman did not marry according to the laws of Israel, 
but instead underwent a marriage ceremony according to other laws, Israeli laws do not 
recognize their marriage, because “the woman is not considered to be the man’s wife unless 
it [the wedding] is properly consecrated.” SCHERESCHEWSKY & CORNINALDI, supra note 
87, at 197. 
 89 SCHERESCHEWSKY & CORNINALDI, supra note 87, at 195. 
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marriage that was performed in Israel according to religious law and not, for 
example, to civil “mixed marriages,” which were performed in Israel. Civil 
marriages mean marriages that are not performed in compliance with religious 
law but instead according to the secular civil law of the state in which it was 
performed.90 In Israel, it is not possible to perform a civil marriage between 
Jews, and the only way to do this is to travel outside Israel, for example to 
Cyprus, Malta or other European or Latin American states.91 Consequently, 
spouses who married in a civil ceremony in Israel are not considered to be 
“spouses” for the matter covered by Clause 8 of the Evidence Ordinance. With 
regard to civil marriages performed abroad, the courts in Israel recognize civil 
marriages of Jews performed abroad, when they were lawful according to lo-
cal law in the place where the ceremony was held.92 Since Amendment 16 
expanded the definition of “spouse” to include cohabiting spouses, married 
couples in civil marriages (invalid under Israeli law) would be recognized as 
spouses. This is also true for couples in “mixed marriages.” 
In Israeli law “mixed marriages” are marriages between Jews and gentiles, 
where “gentiles” means persons who are not Jewish. According to the laws of 
Israel, mixed marriages are inconsequential93 and have no validity even if they 
are performed abroad and are valid there.94 Although Israeli law does not rec-
ognize mixed marriages, as a result of Amendment 16, these couples will be 
recognized as spouses under the expanded definition that includes cohabiting 
spouses, insofar as they comply with the definition of that term. Similarly, 
same-sex couples, whose marriage is not recognized under Israeli law, should 
also be recognized as spouses insofar as they comply with such definition. It 
seems to me that any other interpretation that would cause same sex couples 
not to be recognized as spouses for the purpose of the Evidence Ordinance 
fails to realize the goal of the prohibition determined in Section 3 of the Order, 
but also is not in line with the fundamental principles of the system, and thus 
would not stand up to a constitutional test. One of the main innovations fol-
lowing Amendment 16 was expressed in the inclusion of cohabiting couples 
as “spouses” with regard to their competence to testify. Cohabiting couples 
include relationships similar to marriage, including social-familial compo-
nents, which entitle the partners internally to have inheritance rights according 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713–1953, § 2 (de-
termining that “marriage and divorce of Jews will take place in Israel [according to the law 
of the Torah]”); SCHERESCHEWSKY & CORNINALDI, supra note 87, at 210–21. 
 92 SCHERESCHEWSKY & CORNINALDI, supra note 87, at 209; MENASHE SHAWA, 
PERSONAL LAW IN ISRAEL (4th ed. 2001); see also CA 191/51 Scornik v. Scornik,  8 PD  
83, 89 (1954) (Isr.); CA 238/53 Cohen Buslik v. Attorney General, 8 PD 4 (1954) (Isr.); 
HCJ 301/63 Shtreit v. Chief of Rabbi of Israel, 18(1) PD 598, 633–35 (1964) (Isr.). 
 93 SCHERESCHEWSKY & CORNINALDI, supra note 87, at 183. 
 94 Id. at 187–88. 
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to law and obligations relating to assets, and externally—to have social rights 
as spouses, as if they had the status of marriage.95 
Cohabiting couples manage their family life in a shared household, and the 
recognition of the Evidence Ordinance of these couples as spouses constitutes 
the natural and direct consequence of Israeli law’s recognition of this institu-
tion.96 It should be noted that the Evidence Ordinance does not define who 
should be considered a cohabiting couple, but rather it simply determines that 
cohabiting spouses are considered to be spouses. 
Another innovation accepted as part of Amendment 16 and that relates to 
the definition of spouses in the terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Ordinance 
is expressed in the fact that couples who live apart and do not manage a shared 
household together out of the intention to permanently disband their married 
life, even if they live under a common roof, are no longer considered to be 
spouses. These couples were considered spouses according to the law that 
preceded the amendment. As noted, the main reason for the rule that disqual-
ifies a person’s competence to testify against their relative is to avoid forcing 
people in a naturally close relationship from harming their relatives. If the 
relationship between two spouses has ended and they are not in a close family 
relationship at the time of giving evidence, then there is no reason to disqual-
ify them from giving testimony and they should be seen as any other witness. 
 
b. Parents’ and Children’s Testimony 
 
The rule in Section 4 of the Evidence Ordinance determines that in a crim-
inal trial, a parent or child does not have the competence to testify against one 
another and they cannot be compelled to testify against a person accused to-
gether with their child or parent in the same writ of indictment.97 The purpose 
 
 95 BENZION SCHERESCHEWSKY & MICHAEL CORINALDI, supra note 87, at 1074. 
 96 The move to reinforce the institution of cohabiting couples began in social legislation 
that granted rights to cohabiting couples. Examples of such legislation are legislation deal-
ing with the protection of tenants, laws giving rights to benefits from the National Insur-
ance, regulations dealing with eligibility to allowances from various bodies, and also leg-
islation that arranges the right to compensation. Alongside this social legislation, there are 
additional laws that grant rights for “married persons” and “cohabiting couples”, outstand-
ing among these is the Succession Law (1965), at cl. 63. Consideration that equates the 
status of cohabiting spouses with the status of married spouses also exists in laws that do 
not focus especially on the acquisition of rights, such as the Prevention of Family Violence 
Law (1991), cl. 138. See SHAHAR LIFSHITZ, COHABITATION LAW IN ISRAEL IN LIGHT OF THE 
CIVIL LAW THEORY OF THE FAMILY 23–25 (2005) (noting that over the years, case law has 
broadened the various possibilities that can be considered as “cohabiting spouses” and re-
duced the gap between the legal status of “cohabiting spouses” and that of married 
spouses). 
 97 Like the last part of Clause 3 of the Order, the last part of Clause 4 stipulates that it is 
impossible to compel a parent to testify against a person who is accused together with their 
child in the same writ of indictment. Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 3, 4 (1971) (as 
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of the disqualification, like the disqualification that applies to the testimony 
of spouses, is to protect the integrity of the family unit and harmony in the 
home that might be undermined in the case where a parent incriminates their 
child or vice versa. It is noted that in order to annul the competence of parents 
and children to testify one against the other, they must be included within the 
definition of “parents” and “children” according to the Evidence Ordinance. 
They also need to comply with this status on the day when the evidence is 
delivered and not on the day when the offense was committed, insofar as their 
status changed. Here is the place to clarify that the term “child” may be 
thought mistakenly that the exception applies to children who are minors, but 
this is not so.98 First, there is no condition in prohibition determined in Clause 
4 of the Evidence Ordinance concerning the age of the child. Moreover, the 
purpose of this rule is to protect parent-child relations and to prevent parents 
from testifying against their children and vice versa. Thus, this purpose exists 
and should be promoted, irrespective of the question whether the “child” is an 
adult or a minor and what their age is.99 The rule in Clause 8 of the Evidence 
Ordinance does not determine who is considered a parent or child, but rather 
it determines that “‘child’—includes an adopted child, and ‘parent’—includes 
an adoptive parent.” This means that the Order recognizes biological parents 
and also adoptive parents and adopted children, under the condition that the 
adoption was legal in compliance with the Children’s Adoption Act (1981),100 
and it was valid at the time that the evidence is delivered. However, steppar-
ents and stepchildren are not included in the definition of “parent” and 
“child”.101 
 
c. Restrictions to the Exceptions—“Permitted Testimony” 
(Clause 5 of the Evidence Ordinance) 
 
The rule in Clause 5 of the Evidence Ordinance restricts the application of 
exceptions or prohibitions determined in Clause 3 (testimony of spouses) and 
Clause 4 (parents’/children’s testimony).102 While the exceptions prohibit the 
 
amended) (Isr.). It is also impossible to compel a child to testify against a person accused 
together with their parent in the same writ of indictment. This rule means that the prosecu-
tion cannot compel a witness to testify and deliver testimony, a matter which is given to 
the discretion of the child or parent who is asked to testify. Since this rule does not involve 
any difficulty and was also not altered as a result of the amendment, the rest of the discus-
sion will refer to the first part of Clause 4. 
 98 Because in most of Israeli legislation, a “child” is defined as someone who has not yet 
reached 18 years of age. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722–1962, § 16, 106 (Isr.). 
 99 See, e.g., HALEVI, supra note 9, at 630. 
 100 Adoption of Children Law, 5741–1981, 35 (1981) (Isr.). 
 101 Id. 
 102 The Law of Evidence, 5731–1971, §5 (1971) (Isr.): 
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prosecution from bringing relatives to testify against one another, the re-
strictions set out in Clause 5 annul the prohibitions and permit evidence to be 
heard in court. In fact, when the testimony complies with the conditions of 
one of the restrictions determined in the section, the testimony is permitted in 
the sense that it becomes possible to compel the witness to testify against their 
relatives. 
The rules of Clause 5 of the Evidence Ordinance were altered under 
Amendment 16.103 Sub-section (A) includes offenses to which the exceptions 
do not apply.104 According to the amendment, sub-section (B) expands the 
cases in which family members are permitted to testify against their rela-
tives.105 
1. Offences Which Are Not Subject to the Exceptions 
(Restrictions to the Exceptions) 
 
The rule in Clause 5(A) of the Evidence Ordinance relates to offenses that 
are not subject to the exceptions determined in Clauses 3 and 4. I will now 
briefly discuss each of these restrictions. The rule in Clause 5(A)(1) of the 
Order determines that there is no application of the exceptions prohibiting 
spouses, parents, and children from testifying against one another when the 
 
a. The restrictions in sections 3 and 4 will not apply in a criminal trial for 
one of the following: 
(1)  bodily injury or violence or threat to commit one of these; 
(2) an offense under sections 337 or 362 of the Penal Code – 1977 (here-
inafter: the Penal Code), or under article J in chapter H and under articles 
E or F1 in chapter J of the Penal Code, committed by a spouse against 
his spouse, a parent against his child or a child against his parent; 
(2a) an offense under Section 287 of the Penal Code regarding a violation 
of a protective order issued under the Prevention of Violence in the Fam-
ily Law, 1991, or regarding a violation of any other judicial order issued 
under any law that aims to protect the spouse, child or parent of the vio-
lator from him; 
(3)  an offense under sections 244 through 246, 249 and 249A of the Pe-
nal Code, which was committed in relation to one of the offenses speci-
fied in this section; 
(4)  an attempt to commit one of the offenses specified in this section. 
b. The restrictions in Sections 3 and 4 will not apply to the testimony of 
a person who has filed a complaint against their spouse, child or parents, 
in that matter, in a criminal trial concerning the matter of the complaint, 
whether it is the former who filed the complaint in that matter or a com-
plaint was already filed on that matter by another person. 
c. For the purpose of sub-sections (a) and (b) it is the same if the witness 
is the victim of the offense or another person. 
 103 Evidence Order, 5731–1971, cl. 5 (1971) (as amended) (Isr.). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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defendant is accused of one bodily injury, violence, or threat of either of 
these.106 It is important to note that the identity of the victim is not significant. 
The moment that the defendant is accused of a violent offense, even if it is a 
threat of violence directed towards any person and not necessarily towards a 
family member, members of the accused’s family have the competence to tes-
tify against him.107 The accepted approach in case law is that the terms “bodily 
injury” and “violence” should be interpreted according to their meaning in 
common parlance, according to their regular and conventional meaning, irre-
spective of their interpretation in English common law or according to their 
meaning in penal law.108 
The terms “injury” and “violence” were interpreted broadly, and it was 
determined that the term “violence” included all uses of force, of whatever 
strength, and that the term “bodily injury” is not limited to physical injury and 
can be enlarged to include any sort of injury to the victim’s body.109 This in-
terpretative approach enables the courts at different levels over the years to 
determine that “violent offenses” includes offenses of significant violence and 
injury such as murder,110 attempted murder,111 burglary112 and additional of-
fenses although they are not significantly violent,113 such as unlawful impris-
onment and extortion with force,114 extortion with threats,115 rape, 116 and also 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See CrimC 4/84 State of Israel v. Balut, PM(1) 331–32 (1985) (Isr.); CA 78/62 Dar-
shani v. State of Israel, D 16(3) 1814, 1817 (1962). Thus, for example, Clause 34 (24) of 
the Penal Code inter alia defines the terms “injury” and “severe injury.” 
 109 CA 7895/04 John Doe v. The State of Israel (Feb. 8, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); CA 95/50 Arika v. The Attorney General 5 PD 1200, 1204 
(1951) (Isr.) 
 110 An offense according to Clause 300(a) of the Penal Code. See, e.g., CA 500/77 Omri 
v. State of Israel 33(22) PD 681, 698–99 (1979) (Isr.). 
 111 An offense according to Clause 305 of the Penal Code. See, e.g., CrimC (18) 54/58 
Attorney General v. Tweez, 18 PM 187, 192 (1958) (Isr.). 
 112 An offense according to Clause 402 of the Penal Code. See CA 4454/98 Abbas v. 
State of Israel [Isr.] 
 113 CA 7895/04 John Doe v. The State of Israel (Feb. 8, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 114 CA 1620/00 Habashi v. State of Israel (2000), Takdin Legal Database (by subscrip-
tion, in Hebrew) (Isr.). In this case, it was determined that the offense of unlawful impris-
onment according to Clause 377 of the Penal Code and also the offense of extortion by 
force according to Clause 427 of the Penal Code are “violent crimes” for the purpose of 
Clause 5 of the Evidence Order. 
 115 An offense according to Clause 428 of the Penal Code. See CA 7895/04 John Doe v. 
The State of Israel (Feb. 8, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 116 CA 95/50 Arika v. The Attorney General 5 PD 1200, 1204 (1951) (Isr.). In this case, 
in which a father was accused of raping his daughter, it was decided that the daughter had 
the competence to testify against her father. Justice Landoi, with the agreement of Justice 
Witkin, determined that the term “bodily injury” in the words of Clause 5 of the Evidence 
Order is not limited specifically to a physical injury, but that it is possible to extend it to 
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arson.117 On the other hand, offenses of kidnapping from custody,118 trespass 
and break-in to a building that is not a place of residence or prayer,119 and 
even weapons offenses,120 were not recognized as violent offenses. It was also 
determined that “violent offenses” includes violence towards property and not 
necessarily against people.121 
In Section 5(A)(2) the legislator lists certain offenses that were committed 
within the nuclear family unit. In order for the said restriction to apply, two 
cumulative conditions must exist. According to the first condition, the defend-
ant must be accused of one or more of the following offenses: breaching the 
duties of a parent or guardian;122 neglect of children and other supervised per-
sons;123 prostitution and obscenity offenses;124 sex offenses;125 and also of-
fenses of injury to minors and those who are helpless.126 According to the 
second condition, the defendant must have committed these offenses towards 
their spouse, parent, or child. According to the sub-section (c), it is irrelevant 
if the witness that testifies is the victim of the offense or is another person.127 
As an example, if a father committed a sex offense against his oldest daughter, 
then all his children, including also his spouse, will have the competence to 
testify against him in court for that same offense.128 
 
include any injury to the complainant’s body. See also C.A. 396/84 Fiacka v. The State of 
Israel, PD 39(1) 533, 540–541 (1985) (Isr.). 
 117 CA 103/80 Carni v. The State of Israel (unpublished); see Jer 4/84 State of Israel v. 
Balut, PM (1) 324, 333 (1993) (Isr.) (referencing and discussing Carni v. State of Israel). 
Moreover, in Sader v. The State of Israel, the Supreme Court repeated the determination 
that the offense of arson is a violent offense for the purpose of Clause 5 of the Evidence 
Order. VCM 3725/90 Sader v. The State of Israel (Mar. 3, 1990), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) 
 118 Penal Law, 5737–1977 § 373, Special Volume; see also Jer 4/84 State of Israel v. 
Balut, PM (1) 324, 334–36 (1993) (Isr.). 
 119 Penal Law, 5737–1977 § 407(b), Special Volume; see also CA (Hi) 2814/07 Abu 
Kamir v. The State of Israel, (2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.). 
 120 Penal Law, 5737–1977 § 144, Special Volume; see also CrimC (Nz) 1095/00 State of 
Israel v. John Doe, (2001), Takdin Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 121 See, e.g., CrimC (Jer) 3835/05 State of Israel v. Palto (Dec. 19, 2006) Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)(Isr.). In this matter it was determined that an offense 
of wanton damage to property according to Clause 452 of the Penal Code constitutes a 
“violent offense” for the purpose of Clause 5 of the Evidence Order. In CA 49/88 Rokach 
v. State of Israel, PD42(1) 605, 613 (1998) (Isr.), the Supreme Court reiterated the decision 
in the case of Carni. 
 122 Penal Law, 5737–1977, §337 (Isr.). 
 123 Id. at § 362. 
 124 Id. at §§ 199–214. 
 125 Id. at §§ 345–55. 
 126 Id. at §§ 361–88. 
 127 Evidence Order, 5731–1971 §5(c) (Isr.). 
 128 It is noted that in contradiction to the rule in Clause 5(A)(1) which applies in any case 
in which a spouse, parent, or child committed a “violent offense” towards someone, the 
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The rule in Section 5(A)(2a) determines that the exceptions detailed in 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Evidence Ordinance  will not apply to an offense of 
breach of a lawful order129 in which the accused breached a protection order 
according to the Law for the Prevention of Violence in the Family (1991),130 
or any another judicial order according to any law, that was intended to protect 
a spouse, child or parent of the person breaching the order, from the ac-
cused.131 Section 2(A) of the Law for the Prevention of Violence in the Family 
grants the court the authority to give a “protection order”, in which the person 
is forbidden inter alia to enter an apartment in which their family member is 
living or to be within a certain radius from that apartment,132 to harass the 
family member in any way and in any place133 and also to act in any way to 
prevent or make difficult the use of the property that legally serve their family 
member.134 In a case where a person breaches such a “protection order” and 
because of this act a bill of indictment is presented against them for an offense 
of breach of a legal order, then according to Section 5(2a) of the Evidence 
Ordinance, the nuclear family members of the accused have the competence 
to testify against them regarding that same matter.135 
The rules of Section 5(A)(3) of the Evidence Ordinance determine that the 
exceptions set out in Sections 3 and 4 will not apply to offenses detailed in 
this subsection, on condition that they were committed in connection with one 
of the offenses listed in Sections 5(A)(1)-5(A)(2a) of the Order (source of-
fenses) and under the conditions determined therein.136 The offenses listed in 
Section 5(A)(3) are the offenses of disruption and incitement (disruptive of-
fenses), including the following offenses: disruption of court proceedings,137 
misleading an interrogation,138 including misleading an investigation in 
 
rule in Clause 5(A)(2) applies only in cases in which the offense was committed against 
the spouse of the accused, the parent of the accused, or the child of the accused. In a case 
in which the offense was committed towards another person, there is no application of the 
restriction determined in that clause. This means that the exceptions set out in Clauses 3 
and 4 of the Evidence Order will apply. Evidence Order, 5731–1971, § 5 (Isr.). 
 129 Penal Law, 5731–1977, § 287 (Isr.). 
 130 Prevention of Family Violence Law, 5751–1991 (1991) (amendment 5756, 5758) 
(Isr.). 
 131 Evidence Ordinance, 5731–1971, § 5, (1971) (Isr.). 
 132 Prevention of Family Violence Law, 5751–1991 § 2(A)(1) (1991) (as amended) 
(amendment 5756, 5758) (Isr.). 
 133 Id. at § 2(A)(2). 
 134 Id. at § 2(A)(3). 
 135 Evidence Ordinance, 5731–1971, § 5(A)(2), (1971) (Isr.). 
 136 It is noted that there is no obligation that a legal proceeding should take place for the 
source offence, and it is sufficient that the father’s testimony is demanded in order to prove 
the offense of disruption, on condition that the offense was committed in connection with 
one of the source offenses. Evidence Ordinance, 5731–1971, § 5(A)(3), (1971) (Isr.). 
 137 Penal Law, 5731–1977, § 244 (Isr.). 
 138 Id. at § 245. 
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aggravated circumstances; 139 misleading testimony140 including misleading 
testimony in aggravated circumstances,141 and also harassing a witness142 in-
cluding harassment of a witness under aggravated circumstances.143 
 
2. The Complainant’s Testimony (Section 5(B) of the 
Evidence Ordinance) 
 
The rule in Section 5(B) was added as part of Amendment 16 to the Evi-
dence Ordinance. The legislation of sub-section (B) amended the historical 
injustice that before its legislation had especially affected the victims of an 
offense, who had no competence to testify against a family member that had 
harmed them, even in a case in which they complained about the offender’s 
acts at the police station. In this manner, the evidence laws had prevented vic-
tims from having the opportunity to realize proceedings against the person 
who had transgressed against them. Section 5(B) was added as part of the 
Amendment, determining that when a person complains against their family 
member, there will be no application of exceptions set out in Sections 3 and 
4, and they will have the competence and will even be obliged to testify 
against that family member. Beyond providing an opportunity for family 
members to exhaust all proceedings against the family member that harmed 
them, there is an assumption that when someone chooses to complain about 
their family member, they reveal their opinion that the family unit has been 
disrupted, and so there is less justification to prevent their testimony in order 
to maintain the integrity of the family unit.144 
According to extant law, the decisive factor for the application of this re-
striction is the presentation of a complaint regarding the same matter.145 When 
the witness presents a claim against their family member, then, on their own 
initiative, they move the system to conduct a criminal process against their 
family member, and as such, they are not entitled to refuse to testify during 
that process.146 This means that it is possible to avoid the situation in which a 
writ of indictment is presented relying on a person’s complaint and then later 
that person decides not to testify in court, and thus the necessary certainty is 
attained for the prosecution.147 If giving the testimony was subject to their 
 
 139 Id. at § 249A. 
 140 Id. at § 246. 
 141 Id. at § 249A. 
 142 Id. at § 249. 
 143 Id. at § 249A. 
 144 See Memorandum to the Law of 2013, supra note 6, at 2; see also Proposed Bill to 
Amend the Evidence Order (no. 16) (Family Members’ Testimony), 2013, Book of Laws 
44 (hereinafter Proposed Law from 2013). 
 145 Id.; see also the Memorandum to the Law of 2013, supra note 6, at 2. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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discretion, there would be a fear that the accused might exert improper pres-
sure during the proceedings to persuade the witness to retract and choose not 
to testify against them.148 Thus, giving evidence is considered obligatory and 
is not subject to the witness’s discretion. In this case, Israeli law deviates from 
the two recognized generic models. If the competence model, at one extreme, 
cancels the family member’s competence to testify, and the privilege model, 
at the other extreme, grants the witness privilege, then this existing arrange-
ment is between these two poles. This, in my opinion, is its clear advantage. 
On the one hand, it enables the claimant to testify against their family member, 
and thus constitutes a deviation from the competence model. While in contrast 
to the privilege model, it does not allow the witness to choose whether to tes-
tify or not. Such an arrangement does not only contribute clearly to the clari-
fication of the truth and promote legal certainty, but it even gives a response 
(not provided by the privilege model) to the fear concerning the exertion of 
pressure on the witness and use of improper measures aimed at preventing the 
witness from testifying. 
Sub-section (C) also determines that it is not necessary for the family mem-
ber to be the first one to turn to the police or another investigative body on the 
same matter, for them to be considered as the “complainant” for the purpose 
of the said section.149 Even in a case in which another person presented the 
complaint, and it was only afterwards that the spouse, parent or child, accord-
ing to the matter involved, of their own initiative also complained to the police 
on the same matter, the section will apply, and the family member will have 
the competence to testify and will even be obliged to testify.150 To remove any 
doubt, in sub-section (C) the legislature clarifies that the restrictions listed in 
Section 5(A) and (B) applies whether the witness is the victim of the offense 
or if the witness is another person.151 Thus, for example, in a case where a 
person commits a financial offense against their elderly parents, and the per-
son who presents the complaint is the son of the accused. The son is competent 
and even obliged to testify against his father in the trial that ensues against the 
father in this matter, and it is irrelevant that the witness’s grandmother and 
grandfather were the victims of the offense and not him. 
 
F. Canada and New Zealand 
 
In contrast to the legal systems discussed above, there are some states that 
do not determine specific arrangements for the testimony of family members. 
In these systems the family unit is not a protected value, and family members 
have the competence and are compelled to testify like any other witness. For 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Evidence Ordinance, 5731–1971, § 5(C), (1971) (Isr.). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
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example, in Canada, until 2015, a rule rooted in common law forbade spouses 
from testifying one against the other, but only for specific offenses such as 
sex offenses, prostitution and obscenity, or offenses towards minors and the 
helpless.152 In 2015, the Canada Evidence Act (1985) was amended so that 
spouses have the competence to give evidence against each other.153 In New 
Zealand in 2006, New Zealand amended its Evidence Act so that anyone has 
the competence to testify in any legal proceedings, either criminal or civil, 
including spouses.154 
IV. PART THREE: WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL MODEL FOR THE REGULATION OF 
FAMILY MEMBERS’ TESTIMONY? 
From the discussion above in Part Two, each legal system determines the 
normative tension between the search for the truth and the integrity of the 
family unit in a different way and sets the point of balance along the normative 
spectrum in a different position. While in Canada and New Zealand the legal 
systems prefer revelation of the truth and doing justice above the integrity of 
the family unit, other states regulate family members’ testimony along the 
spectrum between these two values. 
In contrast to English law (that does not annul the competence of parents 
and children to testify one against the other)155 or American law (that does not 
grant any privilege to parents and children),156 the prohibitions in Israeli law 
against providing evidence apply to both parents and children.157 In Australian 
law, parents and children are granted privilege similar to that given to 
spouses.158 According to my approach, the application of the prohibition to 
bring parents and children to testify, and not only to spouses, provides com-
plete and beneficial protection to the family unit and realizes its purpose. The 
harm to the family unit may not only be when the prosecution is entitled to 
bring the spouse to give evidence against his spouse, but may also occur when 
it is entitled to compel parents to testify against their children and vice-versa. 
The fact that in some of the states the respective prohibitions or privilege ap-
ply for spouses but do not apply to parents and children engenders difficulty. 
When evidentiary laws aim to protect the family unit, the arrangement should 
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apply (whether it annuls the family members’ competence to testify or grants 
them privilege) for spouses and also for parents and children. While in the 
case where the evidential laws do not aim to protect the family unit at the cost 
of hindering the search for the truth, then the prosecution should compel the 
family member to testify. 
English law and Israeli law regulate spouses’ testimony under the compe-
tence model. Both annul spouses’ competence to testify, one against the other. 
However, a list of restrictions to exceptions in Israeli law encompasses more 
than its English parallel, and in this manner Israeli law enables spouses to be 
compelled to testify in many more cases than in English law.159 
In contrast to English and Israeli law, U.S. federal law and also the law of 
most of the constituent states of the United States determines that spouses 
have the competence to testify against their partners.160 However, they cannot 
be compelled to do so.161 U.S. law, like English law, does not cancel the com-
petence of parents and children but also does not grant them privilege.162 In a 
rather crude and inclusive manner it could be said that the point of balance in 
U.S. law is closer to the factual truth, both in relation to English law, that 
annuls spouses’ competence and prevents them from testifying against each 
other, and also in relation to Israeli law, that annuls the competence of both 
parents and children and also that of spouses. 
Apart from the normative tension discussed above, it should be noted that 
the granting of privilege to a witness makes the management of criminal pro-
ceedings in court more difficult, contributing to a lack of certainty and hin-
dering the process of justice by enabling the exertion of pressures on witnesses 
to prevent them from testifying in court. These disadvantages, discussed in 
the first paragraph of this Article, are significantly expressed in American law; 
however, they do not characterize the arrangement that exists in Israel. 
Like U.S. law, Australian law regulates family members’ testimony under 
the privilege model.163 However, in contrast to U.S. law, Australian law grants 
privilege not only to spouses but also to parents and children.164 Thus, the 
protection that Australian law provides for the family unit is more compre-
hensive than its parallel in the United States. This resembles Israeli law in that 
it includes spouses, parents and children in the group of family members.165 
Yet, Australian law is unique among the other discussed systems, since it in-
cludes a mechanism of judicial criticism for family members’ testimony that 
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balances the arrangement concerning the duty to testify.166 Although the leg-
islation provides family members with the right to make use of privilege and 
avoid incriminating their relatives, it also grants the court the authority to in-
tervene and remove this privilege, if necessary, according to the circum-
stances of each case.167 In a case in which the witness does not use the privi-
lege, they can deliver testimony and their choice will help the court to clarify 
the truth.168 In a case where the witness chooses to use privilege, the court can 
remove the privilege after weighing the competing values and determining 
that, in the case before the court, the investigation of the truth necessitates 
removing the privilege, even at the cost of harm to the family unit.169 
The fact that the use of privilege is performed under the court’s supervision 
enables the judge to consider the conflicting values and to form an ad hoc 
balance between them, in any case according to its circumstances. When a 
witness uses the privilege, they may take foreign considerations into account, 
motivated by personal motives and subject to improper influences and pres-
sures. When this choice is critiqued by the court, the court will take broader 
considerations into account relating to the search for truth and the public in-
terest that is liable to be harmed as a result of the use of this privilege. It is 
argued that the judicial critique that exists in Australian law, sets the point of 
balance closer to the value of the search for factual truth, but this is if tran-
spires that the number of cases in which witnesses testified against their fam-
ily members is high, whether the witness waived their privilege or used it but 
the court ordered the removal of privilege. 
In contrast, Israeli law includes a special rule that relates to the filing of a 
complaint at the police station by a family member. According to the existing 
rule, from the moment that this complaint is filed, the family member has the 
competence to testify and is even compelled to do so in the trial that takes 
place against their family member.170 In contrast, according to the privilege 
model, the witness who complained against their family member is granted 
privilege. If the witness uses this privilege, the state’s ability to bring the ac-
cused who harmed protected values to trial and to convict them is hindered. 
In this way, the purposes of penal law are not only harmed, but the admin-
istration of justice is thwarted. Insofar as the number of witnesses that choose 
to use privilege is larger, then a harsher blow is dealt to the search for the 
truth. Consequently, Israeli law that requires family members who filed a 
complaint at the police station to testify in court, thereby oiling the wheels of 
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criminal justice, also contributes to legal certainty. This allows for sides to 
prepare for the trial under the assumption that a family member will testify in 
court (since it is possible to compel them to testify), whether for the benefit 
of the presentation of a writ of indictment, consolidation of a plea agreement, 
or management of the trial. 
This situation constitutes a deviation from the competence model but, at 
the same time, also constitutes a deviation from the privilege model, since 
from the moment that the witness filed the complaint at the police station, they 
not only have the competence to testify but can also be compelled to do so. 
This “hybrid” solution has the advantages of each of the models, while pro-
tecting the two conflicting values—the search for the factual truth and protec-
tion of the family unit—without the protection of one causing a cost to the 
other. When the state does not compel the witness to file a complaint against 
their family member, it does not initiate the harm against the family unit. And 
when the state compels the person who files the complaint to testify against 
family members, it enables the prosecution and the court to try accused per-
sons and bring about their conviction or, at least, their detention to increase 
the probability that this will happen. When we add the restriction to the list of 
offenses noted in Section 5 of the Evidence Ordinance, according to which 
family members have the competence and are obliged to testify against their 
accused-relatives,171 then the result is that despite the family members’ com-
petence being annulled under Israeli law, there are many cases in which the 
prosecution has the possibility of compelling family members to testify and 
consequently to increase the probability that guilty defendants will be con-
victed. 
Against this background, it becomes pertinent to ask: Which model is op-
timal for the regulation of family members’ testimony? As indicated in the 
discussion in Part One of this Article, each of the models has its own ad-
vantages and disadvantages. In my opinion, the optimal model is one which 
allows a deviation from the existing arrangement, whether the law annuls the 
family members’ competence, or if it grants them privilege but compels fam-
ily members to testify against their relatives in certain cases. The assumption 
is that strict, formal rules are liable to hinder the fact-finding task and to create 
unjust results. In order to prevent such results, a deviation from these rules 
should be permitted in suitable circumstances. An optimal model or regulation 
would allow two conflicting values to be protected simultaneously: the search 
for the truth and the administration of justice on the one hand and the integrity 
of the family unit on the other. However, such an arrangement should also 
include exceptions that would enable the possibility of compelling witnesses, 
in certain circumstances, to testify against a family member despite potential 
harm to the accused’s family unit. The purposes of criminal procedure are to 
convict guilty defendants and to acquit the innocent. Since the prohibition of 
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family members’ testimony, whether by annulling their competence or by 
granting them privilege, harms the possibility of convicting guilty defendants, 
then the proper and just model is one that does not allow unbearable damage 
to these purposes. 
There are two main ways avenues of deviation from the general arrange-
ment. One way is to determine exceptions by statute, which can allow wit-
nesses to be compelled to testify against their family members formally. The 
second way is to grant the court, whether in a preliminary proceeding or the 
main proceedings, the discretionary authority to compel a witness to testify 
against his or her family member in suitable cases. 
Some cases that justify deviation from the general model are those where 
the defendant is accused of serious offenses. When the defendant has harmed 
important social values such as the sanctity of life, integrity of the body, or 
state security, the search for the truth and administration of justice necessitate 
that the accused should be brought to trial and punished, even at the risk of 
harm to the integrity of the accused’s family unit. Protection of the sanctity of 
life and the public’s bodily integrity should supersede the protection of the 
integrity of family unit of a defendant who is guilty of murder, assault, or rape. 
When a person commits a sex crime, whether the victim is a family member 
or a stranger, and witnesses who are family members do not have the compe-
tence to testify against them (according to the competence model) or choose 
not to testify against them (according to the privilege model), it may be im-
possible to bring the offender to trial. This deals a difficult blow to justice and 
the purposes of both discursive and substantive criminal law. 
Another example of a case that justifies deviation from the existing ar-
rangements is in offenses against national security. National security is one of 
the most important social values and its protection is consequently justified, 
even at the cost of harm to the family unit. For example, in a situation where 
a family member acted with a terrorist organization or spied for an enemy 
state, the protection of the value of security of the state and its members should 
be prioritized over the privacy of the defendant’s home. 
Another exception that justifies a deviation from the general arrangement 
relates to the filing of a complaint by a family member, as determined recently 
in Israeli law. As discussed, according to Israeli law, once a family member 
files a complaint at the police station against their relative for any offense, 
they are compelled to testify against the accused relative in the trial.172 Grant-
ing privilege to witnesses in a case such as this may prompt defendants to 
exert pressure on the witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying against 
the offender. This situation not only makes it difficult to administer criminal 
proceedings, it also harms the goals of criminal procedure. 
Apart from the determination of exceptions that will constitute a deviation 
from the general arrangement and permit the prosecution to compel witnesses 
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to testify against their family members, or in addition to these exceptions, it 
is possible to grant the courts residual jurisdiction—authority according to 
their discretion—to deviate from the general arrangement in suitable cases. In 
a specific case, the court will have to weigh the damage to the family unit 
caused as a result of giving testimony against the possible damage that would 
be caused to the fact-finding task, to public interests. The court will need to 
create an ad hoc balance between the potential damage in the family unit on 
the one hand and the benefit and damage that might be caused to the search 
for truth and the public interest on the other hand, both by the transmission of 
the evidence and by its disqualification. 
In this context, it is possible to adopt the considerations that the courts in 
Australia are required to weigh and to add to them other considerations such 
as: the severity of the defendant’s purported offense; the  testimony’s signifi-
cance for the  trial; the probative value of the testimony; the a priori weight of 
the testimony; whether there is additional evidence on the same matter and 
whether it can be accessed; whether the evidence needs an evidential supple-
ment, and whether such supplement exists in the interrogation file; the type of 
relationship between the witness and the accused and the potential extent of 
harm to this relationship if the witness is required to testify; whether the ac-
cused exerted pressure on the witness to prevent them from filing a complaint 
with the police or testifying in court; and implications of these and other con-
siderations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The competence and privilege models are the two general models for the 
arrangement of testimony of family members. The advantages and disad-
vantages of each of the models are reflected in the degree of normative tension 
between the search for the truth and the integrity of the family unit, and also 
in other aspects. Other aspects include the contribution of each of the models 
to judicial certainty, to the ability of a side to prepare appropriately for the 
trial, and to thwarting improper pressures and means exerted on witnesses in 
order to prevent them from testifying. 
The regulation of family members’ testimony varies in comparative law, 
both from a descriptive viewpoint and from a normative viewpoint. While in 
some states there are no special rules for the testimony of family members, 
other states do determine specific arrangements for spouses’ testimony, and a 
few states regulate the testimony of parents and children. While some states 
regulate the testimony of family members within the competence model, oth-
ers grant the witnesses privilege to choose whether to incriminate the accused 
family member. These legal arrangements range along a spectrum between 
reaching the factual truth and doing justice at one end of the scale and protec-
tion of the integrity of the family unit at the other end of the scale. Each legal 
system sets the point of balance between these two values at a different 
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position, reflecting its approach to the desirable point of balance between the 
two conflicting values. In light of these different arrangements in different 
legal systems, the question arises: Which would be the optimal model for the 
arrangement of family members’ testimony? Since each of the models and 
each form of regulation has its own advantages and disadvantages, I argue that 
the optimal model would be one that determines specific rules for family 
members’ testimony whether by annulling their competence or by granting 
them privilege, but at the same time would enable deviation from that same 
general arrangement in suitable cases. This is to ensure that the administration 
of justice would not be thwarted and that there would be no serious harm to 
the purposes of the criminal procedure and goals of the penal law. Such a 
deviation is possible either by predetermined and statutory exceptions, or by 
granting the courts residual jurisdiction to order the witness’s testimony 
against the family member to be heard in exceptional circumstances. 
In order to provide appropriate and complete protection for the family unit, 
there is room to apply such rules not only for spouses but also for parents and 
children, as occurs in Israeli and Australian law. The family unit may be 
harmed not only when the prosecution is able to compel a spouse to testify 
against the other spouse, but also when it compels a parent to testify against a 
child, and vice-versa. The enlargement of the arrangement to include parents 
and children would severely harm the fact-finding task and the doing of jus-
tice, since the group of witnesses with competence to testify is diminished, or 
alternatively the group to whom privilege is granted is enlarged. However, it 
is possible to minimalize the damage, if when existing arrangements are 
broadened to include also parents and children the exceptions are simultane-
ously determined. This will restrict the application of those arrangements and 
permit deviation from them. In this way, the protection of the integrity of the 
family will not be at a cost to the protection of important social values, and an 
optimal balance will be achieved between those two values. 
 
